University of Central Florida

STARS
HIM 1990-2015
2012

An examination of the history and effect of American sex offense
laws and offender registration
David Shabat-Love
University of Central Florida

Part of the Legal Studies Commons

Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/honorstheses1990-2015
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu
This Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in HIM
1990-2015 by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information, please contact STARS@ucf.edu.

Recommended Citation
Shabat-Love, David, "An examination of the history and effect of American sex offense laws and offender
registration" (2012). HIM 1990-2015. 1303.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/honorstheses1990-2015/1303

AN EXAMINATION OF THE HISTORY AND EFFECT OF AMERICAN SEX
OFFENSE LAWS AND OFFENDER REGISTRATION.

by

DAVID SHABAT-LOVE

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Honors in the Major Program in Legal Studies
in the College of Health and Public Affairs
and in The Burnett Honors College
at the University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida

Spring Term 2012

Thesis Chair: Dr. Abby Milon

© 2012 David Shabat-Love

ii

Abstract
America's Sex Offense statutes and cases are some of the most controversial
sections of modern law, both for the extreme sensitivity of their subject matter as well as
the scope and application of those laws. This thesis is an analysis and overview of both
the objective and subjective issues posed by the current state of those very laws: the
subjective portion explored the development of current laws and the diverse attendant
legal issues such as over-broadness and excessive or misdirected effect as compared
to the Legislative and public intent which directly led to the development of these laws.
Additionally a more objective study of their efficacy was conducted through the use of
data regarding offense rates by locality. This objective data was procured from both the
United States Census and Bureau of Justice statistics, which contained national
averages such as the overall violent crime rate, and from the Florida Department of Law
Enforcement Statistics and was supplemented with additional data from other academic
sources.
It is both the subjective conclusion and the interpretation of objective data that
while the rate of sex offenses has lowered in recent decades this effect is a part of the
overall trend of reduction in all violent offenses, and that the extreme stance of modern
sex offense laws have arguably resulted in the net-negative of creating a class of
individuals ostracized from all but other sex offenders who are virtually incapable of
supporting themselves or at times of even finding legal habitation post-release. With
little to no chance of a productive life, there is the strong possibility of recidivism and
little incentive to avoid re-offending.
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Introduction
In American society sexual or sex-related offenses are considered especially
severe, it is not an undue generalization to state that on the whole those committed
against children quite possibly considered the most heinous crime an individual may
commit. It is not an improper conclusion to state that this very abhorrence has been a
direct motivating factor in the development of the current system of laws, regulations,
and restrictions pertaining to sex offenses and the perpetrators thereof… or perhaps
more rather it is a (if not the) motivating factor in the particularly extreme nature of said
laws.

In order to understand and explore the issues presented by these laws it is
necessary to examine their developmental history. The current state of jurisprudence in
this area did not spring forth whole and complete from the federal legislature as Athena
from the head of Zeus; it evolved over a great deal of time, in fits and starts, first at the
state level and then concurrently with (or at the direction of) interrelating federal
legislation. Throughout their many iterations these laws (federal and state) received
either direct legal challenges leading to their alteration or were influenced in their
development by contemporaneous cases in other jurisdictions, binding or otherwise.

However, before returning to the beginning it will be easier to recognize the
parallels and significance of various developments if the reader has in mind where the
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law stands today: In current day America there exists a standardized system 1 of public
registration and interstate information sharing for all registered sex offenders. Data is
collected (most often at the state level) in the processing of offenders and the federal
government has established a codified system of standards for publication and
interstate information sharing, as well as the proscribed registration schedules for
various classes of sex offenders. This system of laws comes primarily from the Adam
Walsh Protection Act, signed into law in 2006 by then President George W. Bush, and is
also known as the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (hereafter SORNA).
SORNA was drafted to deal with the morass of diverse state laws, offender
classifications, and inconsistent information formats which it superseded.

1

42 USC §16911 et seq.
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Genesis
The practice of compiling lists of individuals convicted of certain crimes and of
compelling them to register their whereabouts with local law enforcement is not a new
one; the concept itself began, or at least grew to significance, as early as 1931 in
Californian cities. Originally these registries, created to deal with what was at the time
considered to be a grave threat to the American public, were not comprised of sex
offenders but rather registered those convicted of various criminal acts which were
commonly (or at least thought to be) connected with organized crime 2 and ostensibly
provided law enforcement with a way to essentially ban convicted gangsters from their
city. Shortly thereafter the state of California expanded these registrations to include sex
offenses, creating in 1947 the first statewide law 3 requiring that anyone convicted of
certain crimes be compelled to provide fingerprints and a photograph to the Sheriff's
office, as well as a written update on their location within five days of changing
residence. Though on the surface this would seem to be an almost perfect parallel to
SORNA right out of the gate, in function if not in subject matter, there is one particular
and fundamental difference: in contrast to today's laws information which was registered
under that system was explicitly forbidden to any members of the public, only a
"regularly employed peace or other law enforcement officer" was permitted to inspect
the material 4 .

2

Los Angeles, California, County Ordinance No. 2339 (1993),
http://www.solresearch.org/~SOLR/cache/gov/US/loc/CA-LA/19330911-file4788.pdf
3
Cal. Pen. Code Article IX Ch. 1-8 (1947),
http://www.solresearch.org/~SOLR/cache/gov/US/st/CA/legis/code/Penal-1947-sex.pdf
4
California Penal Code Article IX Ch.5 §290 (1947)
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With a focus almost entirely on organized crime at this point rather than sexual
offenses the question becomes one of how legislation migrated from the former to the
latter. The answer is both predictable and not. Predictably over time the registrable
offenses were expanded to sex offenses in addition to those related to organized crime,
but in a somewhat surprising move in 1960 the California Supreme Court struck down
all of the state's criminal registration laws in Abbott v. Los Angeles 5 … except for sex
offenses. Perhaps having withstood a State Supreme Court ruling these laws were
somehow legitimized, or perhaps it was merely an issue of publicity or even sheer
happenstance; Whatever the cause the ball had been set rolling and over the next three
decades a handful of states, some mindful of the conspicuous exception to the court's
actions in Abbott and others more broad, would pass laws creating statewide offender
registries of some kind or another.
The First Wave
These laws, enacted over the years from 1944-1993, have the notable distinction
of being the only offender registries designed and passed without direction or mandate
by the federal government. They instead grew organically out of the needs or desires of
the states which passed them, and as such are as diverse in character and effect as the
states which enacted them.

5

Abbott v. Los Angeles 53 Cal. 2d 674, (Cal. 1960)
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As has been stated the progenitor-law of this field was California's 1944 addition
to the penal code 6 , which was followed within the decade by Arizona in 1951 (later
replaced by an 1985 statute). After these two states the next burst of legislation would
begin in 1957 with a notable law in Florida requiring all convicted felons to register;
though in 1993 a later addition to the state statutes would be made specifically
concerning sex offenders. From there Nevada would pass its registry in 1961 with Ohio
following suit a mere two years later in 1963. Alabama, being the last state to pass any
form of sex offender registration law for 16 years in 1967, would become the bookend of
a curious legislative gap until in 1984 at which point within the next decade twenty six
more states ranging from Utah to Rhode Island would pass their own offender
registries… the majority of them in a mere 6 years. A surprising wave of activity to be
sure, particularly in its later years as the pace of legislation rapidly accelerated, but
despite this barely more than half of the United States would have created their own
registries by the time the federal government stepped in and forced the issue.

6

California Penal Code Article IX Ch.5 §290 (1947)
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Opening the Floodgates
Whatever it was which led to the initially glacial pace of legislation on this matter
it soon gave way as a series of highly publicized assaults on children rocked the nation
over the following three years. The remaining half of the states of the Union which had
not yet created a sex offender registry now had no choice in the matter. They would
have to design a registry meeting federally mandated requirements by 1997, the
deadline set by the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent
Offender Registration Act 7 of 1994. In the Wetterling Act all states were required to form
a registry of sexually violent offenders and those who committed sexual offenses
against children, as well as verify the address of registered offenders on an annual
basis for ten years and sexually violent offenders on a quarterly basis for life. During the
time the unamended Wetterling Act was in effect little was standardized among these
registries and beyond the residence verification requirements much of what to do with a
registry was left to the discretion of the state in possession of it. Of particular note is that
even under this act there was no mandatory publication of offenders or offense data,
nor were the classifications of various offenses standardized. At this time such things
were still dealt with exclusively at the state or even local level.
Wetterling Amended: Megan's Law
Once again change would be brought by tragedy. The lack of a publication
requirement would change when in 1996, a mere two years after the Wetterling Act

7

42 USC § 14071 et seq

6

passed, seven year old Megan Kanka of New Jersey was raped and murdered by a
previously convicted sex offender who had been living across the street from her family
the entire time. Public outrage and fear at the thought of released sex offenders living
anonymously among the general public drove the passing of an amendment to the
Wetterling Act named after Megan. The newly amended Wetterling Act, now bearing
Megan's Law, would require law enforcement to release information from their local sex
offender registries deemed relevant to protecting the public… though as with the
Wetterling Act's registries themselves what precisely would be deemed relevant and in
what format such information should be released was once again left to the states. By
the end of 1996 the last of the states, save only for Massachusetts, finally constructed
their own sex offender registries in order to meet the deadline set a mere four years
prior by the Wetterling Act. But though the Wetterling Act and Megan's Law amendment
bore a great resemblance to the modern standard in many ways, chiefly among them
mandatory registration, a rough degree of offender classification, and publicly viewable
registries, there was still little true standardization as what exact information was
released, in what format it was made available, and even the precise nature of said
offender classifications were all left to the discretion of the states 8 .
Piecemeal Progress
In short order it likely became apparent to all involved that a lack of communication
would be a major loophole in these laws; given the technology of the mid-90s and the
disparate standards and protocols of the states someone convicted and registered as a
8

42 U.S.C. § 14071 (1996)
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sex offender had an all too effective means of evading their infamy simply by moving to
another state. Mere months after passing the Megan's Law amendment the federal
government would address this problem in what was a radical departure from their
previous legislation's deference to the discretion of the states. Up until this point each
state had been required to have their own individual sex offender registry, but, by and
large they were allowed to design and run those registries as they saw fit; a system
which by its very nature included little standardization, and as evinced by the apparent
necessity of legislating such a bold solution likely allowed for even less communication
and oversight. The United States Government's solution to this problem was the Pam
Lychner Sex Offender Tracking and Identification Act of October 1996. Along with the
soon to follow Jacob Wetterling Improvements Act of 1997 this back to back burst of
federal legislation would form what is possibly the closest analogue to SORNA at the
federal level before the actual Adam Walsh act itself.

As part of the Lychner Act's efforts to combat the Wetterling Act's greatest
weakness the Attorney General was directed to establish the National Sex Offender
Registry (NSOR), which would allow the Federal Bureau of Investigation to track sex
offenders across the entirety of the United States. The law acted as both a patch and a
facilitator; the FBI was empowered to directly handle the registration of sex offenders
living in states with insufficient registries and to perform its own address verifications

8

thereof, disseminate information "necessary to protect the public" 9 to any involved law
enforcement officials (federal, state, or local), and most importantly notify relevant
federal and state agencies when a given offender moved to another state.

The key pieces of SORNA were beginning to fall into place: Every state had a
sex offender registry meeting at least certain minimum functional requirements, data
from those registries was published for consumption by the general public, and at this
point a national registry curated by the FBI and Attorney General served to facilitate the
tracking of offenders across state lines. Still, there was something missing.

That final, vital, piece to the puzzle would be provided by the 1997 Jacob
Wetterling Improvements Act. Where the Lychner Act cut broadly across a widespread
issue this law would be an act of refinement, a surgical legislative strike of depth and
precision. More loopholes were closed such as requiring the relevant offenders to
register in states where they worked or attended school (if that was not their state of
residence), requiring offenders who moved to re-register under their new state of
domicile's laws, and compelling states to put in place procedures for various situations
involving non-resident offenders. Additionally, to deal with the ever broadening morbid
creativity of the criminal element, States were also given the discretion to register
individuals convicted of offenses not specifically included in the original Wetterling Act.
They were also given permission to create an agency outside of ordinary law
9

The Pam Lychner Sex Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996, Pub. L. no. 104-236, 110 Stat
3094 (1996). PDF

9

enforcement to handle their burgeoning responsibilities of notification and registration.
Lest it be thought that this legislation was entirely one sided it should be noted that the
federal government was not without its additional share of responsibilities as well, it
bearing the requirement for the Bureau of Prisons to notify the states of paroled federal
offenders and for the Secretary of Defense to ensure the proper registration of those
same offenders. But most importantly of all was a single clause, one which would have
the most profound effect out of all changes and laws since the original mandate of the
Wetterling Act:

"(A) STATE REPORTING.—State procedures shall ensure that the
registration information is promptly made available to a law enforcement
agency having jurisdiction where the person expects to reside and entered
into the appropriate State records or data system. State procedures shall
also ensure that conviction data and fingerprints for persons required to
register are promptly transmitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation." 10

In less than 70 words the Wetterling Improvements Act ordered every state to
communicate data on offenders to other states when an offender changes residence,
and to ensure that the data regarding their conviction and a means of identification of
every sex offender, in every state, is added to a single unified National Sexual Offender
Registry. Though federal law would not explicitly state the requirement for unified
communications protocols for another nine years this single clause of the Wetterling
Improvements Act constitutes a de facto attempt at implementing what would later
become SORNA's primary goal. The requirement to readily share information with fellow
states, and proactively with the federal government, would by its very nature create a
10

1997 - The Jacob Wetterling Improvements Act of 1997, Pub. L. no. 105-119, 111 Stat 2440. PDF
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powerful impetus towards standardization of laws and protocols across the United
States.
The Dawn of the Modern Legal Era
Respect for the historical and legal significance of this legislation should
not be taken as praise, however, as the Wetterling Improvements Act is not
without controversy and brings with it the possible birth of a multitude of hard
legal questions which have yet to be satisfactorily answered. The creation of this
new system of communication now meant that being branded a sex offender was
truly an inescapable scar on one's person, as sure as a scarlet letter, and one
which would with the dawn of the information age become a source of ostracism
and at times even personal danger wherever they went within the United States.
Furthermore the decision to allow victim's advocates and law enforcement
representatives to testify as to whether an offender should be considered
sexually violent or not, rather than relying exclusively on the empirical testimony
of experts in relevant medical and criminal fields, may well have had a profound
effect on the disproportionate growth of sex offender registries versus the actual
rate of crime as courts were now open to be swayed by impassioned testimony
rather than merely informed by empirical statistics and data.

It can be argued that the Wetterling Improvements Act marked the turning
point where legislative concern for safety and the efficacy of law enforcement
took a back seat in favor of garnering political capital through ever "tougher" and

11

more public treatment of sex offenders… a strategy which by its very nature
necessitated a continual presence of The Predator in the public consciousness
even as the overall rate of sexual offenses (and indeed all crime) rapidly
plummeted 11 . The legal and in particular constitutional concerns raised by this
change of pace will be discussed later in this work along with a number of
notable cases regarding sex offender registration laws.

There would be a number of additional acts passed by the federal government
from 1997 until SORNA's debut, ranging from federal assistance programs to help
states comply with the increasingly complicated mandates through the adoption of the
World Wide Web for the publication of sex offender registries all the way to requiring
special notice be given to universities (and the students therein) when a registered sex
offender enrolled or was hired as faculty. None would have any truly significant effect on
the overall character of this area of law, though they would add to the increasingly
opaque wall of requirements and mandates, further aggravating the problems caused
by a lack of any real standardization among the states who once again had their own
ideas of how to best fulfill the very general requirements of the various federal acts
passed.

The legal morass that America's sex offender laws had become would be the
status quo until, finally, legislation to put everyone on the same page once and for all

11

Florida Department of Law Enforcement, (n.d.). Ucr offense statistics (1971-2010)
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was passed in the form of the previously mentioned Adam Walsh Protection Act 12 of
2006. In addition to the (by this time) predictable and always politically popular move of
increasing sentences for most sex related crimes SORNA also created and retroactively
applied a nationwide uniform set of standards for the classification, registration, and
publication of both sex offenders and child abusers. The benefits of this standardization
are difficult to overstate; even for the offenders there was a sort of cold boon as at one
time it was possible for an arbitrary number of states to have differing registration
requirements and classifications for the same individual. Under SORNA however even
an offender could at least be sure of their status from one state to the next, providing at
least a consistent standing under the law. It would be local law enforcement
departments however which would derive the greatest tangible benefit from the change.
The new communication protocols and standardized classifications, in tandem with just
shy of a decade's (voluntary or not) cooperation with the NSOR, would suddenly give
police departments the ability to track and manage offenders in their jurisdictions like
never before. Where in the past an out of state offender of a given classification may
have only been identifiable by comparing fingerprints with the federal database or slip
by entirely, under SORNA the offender's data would (at least in theory) be readily and
immediately available in a compatible format and would be immediately comparable to
their own local laws and regulations.

12

42 U.S.C. § 16911 et seq
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Furthermore in a unique twist of the federal government adopting a state
invented construct SORNA would include, in what is quite possibly its most
constitutionally controversial component, an extension of the long standing state laws
concerning civil commitment; the Adam Walsh Protection Act allowed for a federal judge
to commit anyone meeting certain criteria 13 to involuntary confinement and treatment in
a civil mental health institution, even if the offender in question had completed their
original sentence, so long as a judicial review was held every six months if requested by
either the federal treatment program or council. The long standing trend of ever harsher
and more constitutionally questionable post-release "punishments" had finally reached
what may be considered the inevitable conclusion: the ability to simply lock away those
considered too abhorrent to be allowed to live in the world and throw away the key.

13

42 U.S.C. § 16971
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The Elephant in the Room: Legal Challenges
As stated once before SORNA and its precursors were some of the most
constitutionally controversial legislative acts outside of those referring to aliens and
sedition. Seeing its history laid out thusly allows for the 20/20 of hindsight to be put to
healthy use; Controversial aspects of that development now may be addressed with
greater academic rigor with respect to issues of liberty and constitutionality than during
the midst of the meteoric rise of Sexual Predator Politics.

It was inevitable that such far reaching legislation over the decades would have
equally far reaching and significant legal questions for the courts to settle, and indeed
the various laws proscribing and regulating sex offender registration were challenged in
the courts at both the state and federal level across the decades; sometimes
successfully and sometimes not, and often making for persuasive if not always binding
precedents. It was in this environment of ever changing and historically ever broadening
precedent which SORNA and all its attendant laws and amendments evolved, not in a
vacuum. For the purposes of this examination it is best to discuss these legal
challenges in chronological order so as to facilitate the comparison between legislative
and judicial developments.

As previously mentioned the first wave of federal legislation carried with it the
deadline that by 1997 all states must be in compliance with the Wetterling Act or face a
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significant reduction in federal aid 14 . Faced with such an ultimatum a flurry of state
legislation followed the original Wetterling Act, with fully half of the states drafting their
own sex offender legislation shortly after the Wetterling Act was signed into law. As with
all sudden and profound changes there were bound to be equally profound
repercussions, and repercussions there were, beginning with Kansas v. Hendricks 15 in
1997.
Kansas v Hendricks: …and Throw Away the Key
In order to meet the Wetterling Act's mandate Kansas passed the Sexually
Violent Predator Act in 1994 which, in addition to meeting the registration requirements
of the Wetterling Act, also contained some of the earliest provisions for the civil
commitment of "any person who, due to "mental abnormality" or "personality disorder" is
likely to engage in "predatory acts of sexual violence" 16 . This is not to be confused with
the legal option to commit the mentally ill to involuntary treatment, as the SVPA's
preamble states: this legislation was explicitly written to deal with "[a] small but
extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators exist who do not have a mental
disease or defect that renders them appropriate for involuntary treatment" 17 .

Enter Leroy Hendricks, a convicted sex offender with an extensive history of
sexually molesting children, having committed numerous instances of the crime from
1960 up until his most recent incarceration in approximately 1972. Hendricks had been
14

42 USC § 14071 et seq
Kansas v. Hendricks 521 U.S. 346 (1997)
16
Kansas v. Hendricks 521 U.S. 346 (1997), Justice Thomas delivering the majority opinion
17
Kan. Stat. Ann. §59-29a01 (1994)
15

16

in and out of both prison and mental health facilities for some time and had in fact been
determined, prior to his final incarceration preceding this case, to be "safe to be at
large" 18 . As Hendricks was nearing his release date of his most recent prison sentence
in September of 1994 Kansas filed a petition to commit him to a civil treatment facility
involuntarily. In response Hendricks challenged the constitutionality of the SVP Act and
demanded a trial by jury; a request which the court granted though it refused judgment
on the matter of constitutionality. During this trial Hendricks admitted that when
"stressed out" 19 he continues to feel the uncontrollable urge to molest children and
openly agreed with the state physician's diagnosis that he was not cured of his
pedophilia, going so far as to state that "treatment is bullshit". The Jury evidently agreed
and found him to be a sexually violent predator, while the court determined pedophilia to
be a "mental abnormality" and proceeded with plans for commitment. On appeal
Hendricks reiterated his challenge that the SVPA was a violation of his right to Due
Process and protection from Double Jeopardy, as well as constituting an Ex Post Facto
law.

The Kansas state Supreme Court granted certiorari, accepting that appeal, and
found in favor of Hendricks. The Kansas Supreme Court found that the standard of a
"mental abnormality" as opposed to a "mental illness" failed to satisfy Substantive Due
Process in light of the penalty of involuntary civil commitment, but declined to address
the issues of Ex Post Facto and double jeopardy. Unwilling to accept this outcome
18

Kansas v. Hendricks 521 U.S. 346 (1997), Writ of Certiorari
Kansas v. Hendricks 521 U.S. 346 (1997), Writ of Certiorari
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Kansas appealed to the United States Supreme Court , and was granted certiorari as
Kansas v. Hendricks 20 . The United States Supreme Court was not as amenable to
Hendricks' arguments and in what would become the future precedent for involuntary
civil commitment in the United States despite being split 5-4 proceeded to eviscerate
Hendricks' arguments. On the grounds of civil commitment the court flatly stated that a
defendant's liberty interests "may be overridden even in the civil context" 21 and
proceeded to declare that the SVPA clearly set forth the necessary "procedures and
evidentiary standards" such that it does not constitute a violation of Hendricks'
Substantive Due Process rights. The argument of a "mental illness" versus a "mental
abnormality" was openly dismissed as a matter of clerical preference as "The legislature
is therefore not required to use the specific term "mental illness" and is free to adopt any
similar term."

Most controversially of all though is the United States Supreme Court's opinion
with respect to Hendricks' cross petition. Hendricks claimed that civil commitment
constitutes a "newly enacted punishment… predicated upon past conduct for which he
has already been convicted and forced to serve a prison sentence". The Court was
"unpersuaded" by this claim and stated "Nothing on the face of the statute" even
suggested that the SVPA's civil commitment program was designed for any purpose
beyond protecting the public from harm rather than criminal law's primary objectives of
"retribution or deterrence". The Court continued to examine a number of factors
20
21

Kansas v. Hendricks 521 U.S. 346 (1997)
Kansas v. Hendricks 521 U.S. 346 (1997)
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differentiating Kansas' civil commitment program from a criminal proceeding, such as a
lack of a scienter, criminal responsibility being unnecessary for commitment, and the
assumed lack of any deterrent effect as it is presumed that those with a "mental
abnormality" will not be deterred by the threat of confinement. The Court furthermore
rejected the argument that the indefinite duration of commitment was evidence of a
punitive nature, finding instead that "the confinement's duration is instead linked to the
stated purposes of the commitment, namely, to hold the person until his mental
abnormality no longer causes him to be a threat to others" and that the consistent
judicial reexamination of the necessity of that confinement satisfies Due Process;
finding that safeguard reasonably allows for confinement so long as someone is a
"menace to the health and safety of others". Even Hendricks' most convincing
argument, that combined with the utter lack of legitimate attempts at treatment the
totality of the circumstances proved that commitment was nothing more than a
disguised prison sentence, was rejected with the argument that "incapacitation may be
a legitimate end of the civil law" where even those with untreatable conditions or for
whom treatment is "not the state's overriding concern" are concerned.

Hendricks may thus be summed as an individual claiming that what looks like a
criminal case, sounds like a criminal case, has an almost indistinguishable end result
from a criminal case, and possesses none of the alleged characteristics of a civil

19

commitment for one's own and the public's "greater good" 22 must be a criminal case
versus the rebutting argument that civil commitment is not a punitive measure or
criminal in nature because… it is not a punitive measure or criminal in nature. That
virtually tautological argument was also the basis for rejecting Hendricks' complaint that
the SVPA constituted a violation of his protection against Double Jeopardy and Ex Post
Facto; such complaints are inherently related to a criminal proceeding or punitive
measures and simply do not apply to a civil action which by definition can not be a
second trial or a punitive measure.
Kansas v. Crane: Token Safeguards
Following quickly on the heels of Hendricks from the same state was Kansas v.
Crane 23 . Unlike the preceding case Crane did not make a sweeping challenge to the
SVPA itself but rather the case hinged on a point of interpretation regarding the
necessary attributes of an offender in order to qualify for involuntary commitment. The
case began when Michael Crane pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual battery and
(following his plea) the state entered a request that he be evaluated for possible
commitment under the SVPA. With the SVPA firmly vindicated by the Supreme Court of
the United States' decision in Hendricks the question at this point was one of
qualification; Did Michael Crane meet the standard of a "mental abnormality" or
"personality disorder" possessing him of either an "emotional or volitional capacity which
predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses" or "which makes the
22
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person likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence." 24 In the state's opinion 25
Crane's exhibitionism in and of itself did not qualify under the SVPA for commitment, but
in combination with his antisocial personality disorder showed a pattern of "increasing
frequency of incidents involving [respondent], increasing intensity of the incidents,
[respondent's] increasing disregard for the rights of others, and… increasing daring and
aggressiveness." which was found to be a combination of "willful and unlawful" behavior
qualifying Crane for commitment under the SVPA even though his disorders were not
found to negatively affect his "volitional control" in a manner significant enough to
prevent him from "[controlling] his dangerous behavior". Following this evaluation Crane
was ordered to be committed by the Kansas District Court, a decision which Crane
naturally appealed. As in Hendricks the Kansas Supreme Court erred in favor of the
defendant, interpreting the decision of Hendricks to require finding that a defendant has
an inability to control the dangerous behavior in question even if they have an emotional
or personality disorder rather than one of volitional control.

Once again Kansas appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which
granted certiorari, and settled the matter. Unlike Hendricks however this time the United
States Supreme Court handed down a decision which was neither entirely in favor of
Kansas' attempts at commitment nor entirely against Crane. Being a much narrower
case, concerning itself almost solely with the question of self-control (or rather a lack
thereof justifying commitment), the decision was likewise narrower and at the same time
24
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more refined. The Court did agree with Kansas that Hendricks did not require finding an
individual to have an absolute inability to control their actions before committing them
under the SVPA, clarifying that the standard in Hendricks was that an individual finds it
"difficult, if not impossible, for the [dangerous] person to control his dangerous
behavior" 26 , a significant distinction as it is plainly evident that even the most disturbed
of individuals retain at least some ability to control their actions. At the same time the
Supreme Court also stated that a lack of any determination regarding an offender's selfcontrol is in plain violation of the standard set forth in Hendricks which the Court felt
emphasized the constitutional significance of properly distinguishing those offenders
most suited to commitment "from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more
properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings." In its decision in Crane
the court pointed out that the ambiguity of this standard was not an oversight, but a
deliberate attempt to provide only a more general framework for the topic at hand as
constitutional safeguards with relation to mental illness "are not always best enforced
through precise bright-line rules." because of the ever evolving nature of psychiatry as
well as the discretion which the states have in enumerating what precisely constitutes a
given mental abnormality or illness within their jurisdiction. In summation of their opinion
the Supreme Court of the United States felt it most proper to point out that there is
inherent overlap between volitional, cognitive, and emotional abnormalities and that in
"ordinary English" individuals with these families of disorders are “unable to control their
dangerousness” and likewise for constitutional purposes it is unnecessary to distinguish
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between them so long as an examination is made and that standard of at least
substantially uncontrollable dangerousness is met. Having clarified the requirements of
due process and the new standard for the controllability of dangerous behaviors the
case was officially found in favor of Kansas with regards to Crane in particular and
remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion.

Smith v. Doe: Stirrings of Dissent
The next case of note is Smith v. Doe 27 , which continued the line of Ex Post
Facto challenges to sex offender registration laws. The case began in Alaska as two
John Does challenged the retroactive nature of Alaska's sex offender registration law,
which required all sex offenders who entered the state to register with local law
enforcement or the state Department of Corrections within one day of entering Alaska.
John Doe I and II, who had been convicted of sexually abusing minors before the
passage of the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act (ASORA), filed suit on grounds
that applying the registration requirement retroactively was a punitive measure in
violation of their constitutional protections 28 and seeking relief from the application of
that act. Similar to both of the cases from Kansas previously discussed the Does were
first ruled against and then the appellate court found in their favor.
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The United States Supreme Court accepted the case in 2001 when Alaska
appealed the Circuit Court's decision that the act was by nature punitive and therefore in
violation of Ex Post Facto restrictions. Justice Kennedy delivered the majority opinion in
2003 in which, for the first time, the Court directly asked the question of whether a sex
offender registration program was in violation of constitutional prohibitions on Ex Post
Facto laws rather than sidestepping all argument altogether through taking as a given
that the law in question was civil in nature. To answer this question the Court decided to
follow a multi-pronged analysis of the law, asking whether the act in question was
initially punitive in nature (thus settling the matter immediately) or if it instead intended
to create civil proceedings of a regulatory nature. If the latter was found to be the case a
second step was to be taken, analyzing whether the act was in actuality "so punitive
either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention' to deem it 'civil.'" 29

In answer to that first question the Court, despite being willing to discuss the
issue now, still followed its previous logic in the two cases from Kansas; essentially,
starting with a civil nature being a foregone conclusion and from there setting the bar for
overcoming this presumption to be so high that "'only the clearest proof ' will suffice to
override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into
a criminal penalty." 30 Following this standard of deference to legislative intent the Court
naturally found it most expedient to cite directly the Alaskan Legislature's explicit
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statement of intent in ASORA to "[protect] the public from sex offenders" 31 by the
"release of certain information… to public agencies and the general public". With this
legislative intent being so expressly stated the Court returned to its opinion in
Hendricks, finding in this case as it did previously the "imposition of restrictive
measures" 32 to be the "legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective" (emphasis
added) of "a civil ... scheme designed to protect the public from harm".

Previous to this point it has been commented that the Court's actions and
rationale may show an underlying bias in favor of sex offender registration, it is at this
point that bias is demonstrated openly as the Court blatantly engages in an act of
doublethink, citing at once Hendricks as a binding precedent and yet at the same time
directly contradicting that precedent when it proves inconvenient in the current case:
Where before the Court held that it was a virtual certainty that the "objective to create a
civil proceeding is evidenced by its placement of the [SVPR] within [Kansas'] probate
code, instead of the criminal code" 33 the Court, now reading an act held within a state's
criminal code in Smith v. Doe, reversed its position and argued that "The location and
labels of a statutory provision do not by themselves transform a civil remedy into a
criminal one." 34 . It is at once the position of the Supreme Court of the United States that
the placement of an offender registration act within the civil code of a state is sufficient
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evidence that said act is civil in nature, and that the placement of an offender
registration act within the criminal code of another state is immaterial to the act's nature.

With the issue of legislative classification thus settled the Court continued on to
answer the question of whether or not, as the Does alleged, ASORA was still in effect a
punitive measure despite professing to be a mere civil regulatory scheme. To open this
analysis the Court referred first to a test of seven factors from Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez 35 ; Specifically the five factors of whether the topic of examination "has been
regarded in our history and traditions as a punishment; imposes an affirmative disability
or restraint; promotes the traditional aims of punishment; has a rational connection to a
nonpunitive purpose; or is excessive with respect to this purpose" 36 . The majority
opinion, which would meet bitter disagreement from Justice Ginsburg and Stevens'
dissents, examined each factor in turn:

In regard to the history and traditions of punishment, particularly relevant as the
Does alleged ASORA "resemble[d] shaming punishments of the colonial period", the
Court felt that "Any initial resemblance to early punishments is, however, misleading." It
was the majority's argument that the "dissemination of accurate information about a
criminal record, most of which is already public" is not analogous to the punishments of
colonial times as it does not "[stage] a direct confrontation between the offender and the
public" nor qualifies as punishment as it is in "furtherance of a legitimate governmental
35
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objective". The argument at its core was that the State did not intentionally produce
publicity and stigma as "an integral part of [ASORA's] objective" and that any humiliation
or ostracism was a "collateral consequence".

An astute observer will at this point notice a pattern of growing polarization with
regard to registered sex offenders… a schism between the opinions of those who find
themselves questioning the efficacy and constitutionality of the increasingly harsh and
public measures and those who display a growing callousness and utter disregard for,
or perhaps disconnection from, the consequences of registration. The latter, being the
majority in this case, argued that the utter ostracism, loss of any real employment
prospects, and constant (wholly justified) fear of vigilante attacks was a mere "collateral
consequence" not because it was truly an unpredictable byproduct but because the
State did not intentionally seek to provoke these reactions as their primary focus with
ASORA; a position analogous to the teacher who punishes an entire class specifically
for the actions of a single student and later proclaims ignorance when that same student
is violently attacked in revenge.

Continuing in the Mendoza-Martinez analysis the next factor examined by the
Court was the issue of whether or not ASORA subjected the Does to an "affirmative
disability or restraint." 37 As the process of registration is obviously not an act of
incarceration there is unarguably no issue of affirmative restraint. However, the Court
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also felt that ASORA's obligations are less harsh or restrictive than other legislative acts
which debar individuals from a given occupation, and that furthermore "The Act does
not restrain activities sex offenders may pursue but leaves them free to change jobs or
residences." Once again the majority opinion's interpretation was severely disputed in a
dissenting opinion from Justices Ginsburg and Stevens who flatly disagreed, stating
respectively "Beyond doubt, the Act involves an 'affirmative disability or restraint.' 372 U.
S., at 168" and "The statutes impose significant affirmative obligations and a severe
stigma on every person to whom they apply". Justice Stevens additionally made note of
the true significance of the burden placed on registrants under ASORA: An applicable
offender was required to provide (as listed in Justice Stevens dissent) "his address, his
place of employment, the address of his employer, the license plate number and make
and model of any car to which he has access, a current photo, identifying features, and
medical treatment" at least once a year for 15 years and up to four times a year for life;
nor may an offender shave, color their hair, change employers, or borrow a car without
notifying the authorities. And in all cases an offender is given a single working day to
provide updated information to the authorities. Thus while the majority is indeed
accurate in saying that offenders under ASORA are "free to change jobs or residences",
it is once again disingenuously ignoring the actuality of the situation in the same sense
as suggesting that a prisoner within a minefield is free to simply walk away; While it is
technically possible in that it is not explicitly forbidden, it is clear to any observer that the
circumstances are such as to make such an action as arduous and trying as possible in
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order to motivate the supposedly free individual to voluntarily refrain from exercising that
same alleged freedom.

The third Mendoza-Martinez factor examined was whether the act "promotes the
traditional aims of punishment" 38 and while the State of Kansas did agree that
registration provides some manner of deterrent effect it is obvious on its face that
virtually any non-punitive regulatory program must inherently have some ability to deter
or be left utterly incapable of meaningful function. More arguable is the Does' argument
that since registration times are connected to the offense committed and not to actual
danger posed to the public 39 the act is retributive in nature. The Court did not find this
convincing however and claimed that the length of the reporting requirement was
"reasonably related" to the possibility of recidivism, a concern which will be addressed
later in this work.

Next the Court examined what it felt to be the "most important" 40 factor: whether
ASORA could be rationally connected to a legitimate nonpunitive purpose. The
Supreme Court of the United States accepted that it had already been established by
the Court of Appeals that the matter of public safety, so served by notifying the public of
the "risk of sex offenders in their community" 41 , was a legitimate and nonpunitive goal

38

Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003)
Alaska Stat. §12.63.020(a)(1) (2000)
40
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) citing to 518 U.S. 267 (1996)
41
John Doe I, Jane Doe, and John Doe Ii, Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Ronald O. Otte and Bruce M. Amended
Botelho, 259 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001)
39

29

and indeed the Does themselves agreed that purpose was "valid, and rational." 42
Where the Does disagreed with ASORA on this point was whether or not it had a
necessary regulatory connection to that legitimate purpose, as the Does felt that the Act
was not "narrowly drawn to accomplish the stated purpose." 43 The Court disagreed on
this matter, finding that the Act did not require a "close or perfect fit" to its nonpunitive
aims in order not to be considered a "sham or mere pretext." 44

The final Mendoza-Martinez factor examined, and fundamental to the issue of
whether or not the Act was punitive in actuality if not in name, was whether or not the
Act was "excessive in relation to its regulatory purpose" 45 . The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals was significantly motivated to decide in favor of the Does by two factors: that
ASORA applies to all offenders regardless of the danger they pose in the future and that
there are no limits or restrictions on accessing the information offenders report. The
United States Supreme Court on the other hand was unconvinced, stating only that it
found "Neither argument… persuasive." 46

Coming to the end of the Mendoza-Martinez factors the Court argued that the
State of Alaska was within its right to legislate with regard to sex offenders as a class,
as the Ex Post Facto clause does not "preclude a State from making reasonable
categorical judgments that conviction of specified crimes should entail particular
42
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regulatory consequences." 47 Furthermore the Court buttressed the legitimacy of
classifying sex offenders as a class to be inherently dangerous quoting a previous case
which characterized the risk of recidivism as "frightening and high" as well as claiming
that "[sex offenders] are much more likely than any other type of offender to be
rearrested for a new rape or sexual assault" 48 , basing these claims on crime statistics
from 1997.

Concluding the majority opinion the Court answered one last concern regarding
the registration mandate's lack of dangerousness assessments in light of the Hendricks
decision. It was the Court's opinion that the magnitude of Hendricks' restraint on an
individual is what required an individual finding of dangerousness, whereas the "minor
condition of registration" 49 may forego individual assessments in lieu of allowing the
public to make that assessment on a private basis using the published information.
Arguments regarding the breadth of the internet's reach also fell short in as it was
argued that individuals must by the nature of the internet choose to visit a website and
seek out that same published information. ASORA was admitted to be less than ideal,
but as Justice Kennedy stated in closing the question before the Court was not whether
the Alaskan State Legislature had "made the best choice possible" but whether or not
ASORA was "reasonable in light of the nonpunitive objective", and the answer
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according to the majority of the 6-3 split was Yes: "The Act is nonpunitive, and its
retroactive application does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause".

Smith v. Doe marked a turning point in sex offender cases, not just for answering
the Ex Post Facto question directly for the first time but also for being the first case in
which dissenting opinions begin to openly refer to these laws as punitive and pay more
than lip service to the burden they place on an offender. Most notably of these is Justice
Stevens' landmark dissent in which he states:
"It is also clear beyond peradventure that these unique consequences of
conviction of a sex offense are punitive. They share three characteristics, which
in the aggregate are not present in any civil sanction. The sanctions (1) constitute
a severe deprivation of the offender's liberty, (2) are imposed on everyone who is
convicted of a relevant criminal offense, and (3) are imposed only on those
criminals. Unlike any of the cases that the Court has cited, a criminal conviction
under these statutes provides both a sufficient and a necessary condition for the
sanction."

As was just discussed the majority opinion went to extreme lengths to find a
means, no matter how tenuous or contrived, to find ways to justify these laws in light of
their criminal appearance going so far throughout various cases as to tautologically
claim a law is civil because it is civil 50 . In this landmark dissent Justice Stevens plays
the role of the child pointing out that the emperor is not in fact wearing any clothes,
openly and fervently pointing out that no matter how many logical fallacies or contrived
constructs of language are used to hold up an obviously punitive measure as regulatory
or civil somehow, when a law has every characteristic of a criminal punishment it is not
50
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sufficient to merely state that it is a civil matter by bare assertion. Justice Stevens
furthermore refused to downplay or brush aside the profound impact which registration
has on the lives of offenders, stating ASORA "[imposes] significant affirmative
obligations and a severe stigma on every person to whom [it applies]". This dissent
presents one of the harshest and to date one of very few open criticisms to the concept
of a public sex offender registry.

Justice Ginsburg (joined by Justice Breyer) also dissented with equal
vehemence, stating the act imposed "onerous and intrusive obligations on convicted sex
offenders" and "[exposed] registrants, through aggressive public notification of their
crimes, to profound humiliation and community-wide ostracism." 51 Additionally Justice
Ginsburg did not follow the majority on the reasonability of considering sex offenders as
a class to be dangerous by default and felt the "touchstone" which triggered the act
being solely a past crime and not current dangerousness to be evidence of the act's
penal nature. Justice Ginsburg's opinion on class versus individual dangerousness
would also be a key factor in finding the act to be excessive, which she felt to be where
the act ultimately crossed from nonpunitive to openly penal. Proving that point she
argued that the act's reporting requirements were in and of themselves "exorbitant"
before anything else was even considered, and most significantly of all in her opinion
was the absolute lack of any possibility for rehabilitation under the law; once so branded
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a sex offender would be subject to "inescapable humiliation" without the chance of ever
shortening or being released from their registration requirements.

At the same time as Smith v. Doe the United States Supreme Court was also
hearing Connecticut Dept. of Public Safety v. Doe 52 , a case regarding the Connecticut
Department of Public Safety's website which provided data on registered sex offenders.
A John Doe challenged the law in federal court claiming that the law behind the
Connecticut Department of Public Safety's website (and information collections for said
website) was a violation of his fourteenth amendment right to Due Process. The District
Court of Appeals decided in the Doe's favor on the grounds that hearings were not
provided prior to public disclosure, but the state appealed and the United States
Supreme Court accepted the case.

The United States Supreme Court decided unanimously that "due process does
not require the opportunity to prove a fact that is not material to the state's statutory
scheme." and that even a defamatory injury "does not constitute the deprivation of a
liberty interest." 53 With this decision arguments at the federal level regarding a public
sex offender registry were effectively silenced. The Supreme Court had ruled that such
registries were non-punitive civil measures, not subject to the prohibition of Ex Post
Facto laws, that registration was not a violation of due process even without a hearing
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before publication, and that the damage to a registered offender's reputation did not
constitute a loss of a liberty interest.

The only aspect of the modern system of sex offender legislation not yet challenged
was brought into existence in 2006 with the passing of the Adam Walsh Act: Whether
the federal government could order the continued incarceration of a registered sex
offender beyond the term of their actual prison sentence through civil commitment and if
so in what way. The inevitable challenge would be brought in 2010 by United States v.
Comstock 54 .

In United States v. Comstock 55 then attorney general Alberto Gonzales certified
that Graydon Comstock was a "sexually dangerous person" six days before the
conclusion of Comstock's prison sentence. Under the terms of the Adam Walsh Act this
gave the federal government the ability to commit Comstock to a civil institution, a
power which was challenged by Comstock on the grounds that it fell outside of the
Enumerated Powers of Congress. The lower courts agreed with Comstock's challenge
and ruled the law which Gonzales was applying as unconstitutional, and the federal
government appealed. The United States Supreme Court accepted the case and,
limiting their decision to the issue of Congressional Authority, ruled 7-2 that under the
Necessary and Proper Clause Congress had the authority to enact the provisions
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challenged. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court and laid out "five
considerations" by which the law was constitutional:

First, the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress broad power to enact
laws that are "reasonably related" to executing the other enumerated powers.
Second, the statute at issue "constitutes a modest addition" to related statutes
that have existed for many decades. Third, the statute in question reasonably
extends longstanding policy. Fourth, the statute properly accounts for state
interests, by ending the federal government's role "with respect to an individual
covered by the statute" whenever a state requests. Fifth, the statute is narrowly
tailored to only address the legitimate federal interest.

The five considerations are the circumstances and context of the Adam Walsh
Act which altogether satisfy a nexus of valid Congressional authority. When the five
considerations are taken individually their interplay in this nexus can be examined
through its component parts: The first consideration, that of a respected use of the
Necessary and Proper Clause, is justified by the nature of the Adam Walsh Act as being
primarily a system of standards for states to tailor their already existing laws to. This
nature also satisfies the second consideration that the Adam Walsh Act composes a
"modest addition" to various related statutes which have existed for decades, as well as
the third consideration that the specific statute in question is merely the logical
continuance of a "longstanding policy"; a policy taken directly from existing state level
laws and which had come before the United States Supreme Court previously 56 .
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The remaining two considerations are born of another line of logic relating to the
proper relation between the federal government and the states. In the fourth
consideration the federal government has in place procedures to effectively "hand off"
any case to a state with proper jurisdiction; effectively federal involvement is voluntary
and only at the sufferance of the states. Finally in the fifth consideration the statute is in
and of itself found by the United States Supreme Court to be both "narrowly tailored"
and dealing with an issue in which there is a "legitimate federal interest".

Outliers: Unique Circumstances
Firstly, there is the matter of a significant legal outlier: Missouri. Of all states
Missouri has produced some of the most unique trials and decisions with regards to this
topic, due in large part to a constitutional provision which states that "no Ex Post Facto
law… or [law] retrospective in its operation… can be enacted." 57 Bolstered by this
surprisingly rare constitutional prohibition on Ex Post Facto legislation a number of sex
offenders have made various challenges over the years to everything from registration
itself to a statute regarding Halloween activities 58 . Perhaps more extraordinary than the
breadth and number of legal challenges brought in this state is the rate of success
which its residents enjoy, many of these challenges have been successful even if only
to the extent that the courts render a decision applicable only to a given individual
plaintiff 59 .
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The most significant of these challenges arises as a direct challenge to the
Missouri Megan's Law. In the case which would eventually become Doe v. Phillips 60
when it reached the Missouri Supreme Court a number of male and female resident sex
offenders (but none adjudicated Sexually Violent Predators) alleged that, in the words of
Justice Laura Stith, "while it may be proper to apply the registration and notification
requirements to SVPs and other violent sexual offenders, it is unconstitutional to apply it
to relatively minor offenders such as [the plaintiffs]". In addition to these grounds the
Does, those whose standing had not been rendered moot when a bill altering Missouri's
laws to expand the categorization of SVPs and alter which offenses are permitted to
petition for removal 61 , buttressed their argument with a number of other significant
complaints as well, even going so far as to cite the United States Constitution's
prohibition against state bills of attainder 62 . The primary thrust of these additional
grounds was one of Due Process, Missouri's Megan's Law was argued to be a violation
of the Does' substantive due process rights, specifically their personal choices and
freedoms once released from custody as well as their right to privacy and freedom from
a particularly abhorrent stigma. The Does, or rather a particularly inventive member of
their legal counsel, also proffered the curious interpretation of Equal Protection: They
argued their right to such was violated by the indiscriminate application of the Law's
registration requirements and personal restrictions to both significant and violent
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offenders, and those who either pled out to lesser crimes or otherwise had attached to
them no proof of future dangerousness.

The Missouri Supreme Court, though bound by both the federal and state
constitutions, nevertheless found grounds on which to deny the Does' arguments of
Equal Protection, Due Process, and Ex Post Facto effect through the ruling of State v.
Rushing 63 where a previous sitting of the Court believed analysis of the federal
constitution to be "strongly persuasive" to the interpretation of comparable sections of
the state's constitution, finding a persuasive reason not to expand upon Missouri's
constitutional equivalent to the federal Fourth Amendment. The Phillips court,
respecting this precedent, thus found the Does to have provided no persuasive reason
to interpret Missouri's constitutional provisions with greater latitude than those "nearly
identical" in the federal constitution 64 .

In deciding Doe v. Phillips the Supreme Court of Missouri ruled that it was
unconstitutional to place on the registry anyone convicted of (or who had pleaded guilty
to) a registrable offense prior to January 1st 1995 and remanded the case back to the
lower Jackson County Circuit Court… which promptly ordered the removal of anyone
placed on the registry retroactively. This resulted in two immediate reactions: First a
defendant (James Keathley) appealed back to the Missouri Supreme Court and second
the Missouri state legislature attempted to pass a constitutional amendment specifically
63

State v. Rushing, 935 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1996)
Doe v. Phillips,194 S.W.3d 837 (Mo. banc 2006)

64

39

exempting sex offender laws from the ban on retrospective laws. The Legislature's
attempts failed two sessions in a row in 2007 and 2008 due to the Missouri House of
Representatives failing to pass the bill as the Senate had, while Keathley's appeal was
accepted by the Missouri Supreme Court and the case (Doe v. Keathley now) was
heard in 2009. In this decision, occurring after the Adam Walsh Act had been signed
into law, it was ruled that though Missouri's constitution itself exempt certain offenders
from registration the injunction of Doe v. Phillips could not exempt sex offenders from
that same requirement under the separate federal obligation 65 imposed by SORNA.
Now held under a federal obligation outside of the purview of the Missouri constitution
all sex offenders who had previously been exempt by the Doe v. Phillips injunction were
required to register once again.

This requirement would in 2010 be overturned in part but not in whole when a
Cole County Circuit Judge ruled that those who had pleaded guilty to a sex offense prior
to the original Missouri registration law were not required to register themselves as the
applicable federal laws in Keathley did not apply in their cases, carving a narrow
exception to the Keathley ruling. As stated previously the nature of Missouri's unique
constitutional provisions provide a rare legal climate in which challenges to registration
or other post-release restrictions have unusually persuasive constitutional grounds on
which to stand. As such there have been numerous additional cases in Missouri related
to restrictions on residence or other activities which resulted in relief only for the
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individual plaintiff in the case; these cases are not particularly significant except for their
success in and of itself and being so narrowly construed as to literally apply to one
individual are unlikely to be especially persuasive precedents 66 , therefore beyond this
degree they merit no further discussion here.

One other state-limited case of note, especially as it was decided concurrently
with the opening arguments of Kansas v. Crane, is Hawaii's State v. Bani 67 of 2001; in
which the Hawaii State Supreme Court ruled that the state's sex offender registry
violated the Due Process clause of Hawaii's state constitution as it required "public
notification of (the potential registrant's) status as a convicted sex offender without
notice, an opportunity to be heard, or any preliminary determination of whether and to
what extent (he) actually represents a danger to society." Bani also had the unique
notability of deciding in favor of a challenge that a sex offense law was in violation of the
right to Due Process at the same time that arguments were being heard regarding a
similar issue of Due Process in a United States Supreme Court case 68 , Kansas v.
Crane, as previously discussed.

While the status of sex offender legislation at the state level was in all likelihood
entrenched with the decisions of Crane and Smith v. Doe it was likely that the decision
in Comstock, finding the most comprehensive and far reaching federal legislation to be
66

F.R. v. St. Charles County Sheriff's Department and state of Missouri v. Charles A. Raynor as
examples
67
State v. Bani, 36 P.3d 1255 (Haw. 2001)
68
Crane, discussed on page 6
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a valid exercise of congressional authority, has secured the future of sex offender
legislation in the nation. Short of a significant legislative reversal or a radical alteration
of the United States Supreme Court's judicial makeup it is unlikely that any further
challenges to the primary aspects of the modern SORNA system, i.e. registration,
publication of personal information, and civil commitment, would be successful.

Objective Analysis
As previously stated it is a common fact that for some time politicians and other
involved parties have claimed the progressive iterations of sex offender legislation,
particularly the increasingly penal nature and growing harshness of the law, has been
the direct root of any successes in lowering the overall rate of sex crimes and
colloquially making the nation "safer" in that respect. It is also a common fact that,
despite the previous claim, the political rhetoric on the subject (as well as the position of
the mainstream media) has been one of Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt. Threats and
dangerous predators lurk around every corner waiting to snatch any child within and
commit unspeakable crimes. Spending even a small amount of time listening to virtually
any major news network and it becomes immediately apparent that this imagery and
rhetoric, the boogeyman of The Sexual Predator, permeates the public consciousness
and likely provides a substantial justification for the cycle of continually harsher sex
offender legislation.
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A firm judicial or legislative standing is not a license to simply accept the status
quo and take all arguments in support of it for granted, particularly when confronted with
an issue this sensitive and prone to inflammatory rhetoric and politicization. It is a civil,
moral, and academic imperative to examine the facts and objectively determine the
efficacy of the status quo in light of its supposed goals and whether the evidence
supports the continued political claims with regard to these laws. In order to avoid
numerous experimental difficulties, and in keeping with the nature of this work as well
as decades old wisdom 69 , the methodology of this analysis is as follows.
Methodology
Accepted as given: First, the political rhetoric regarding sex offender registration
and the accompanying restrictions are commonplace in the general media and in
general may be summed up as stating that the various iterations of registration laws
over the years have directly resulted in increased "safety", which will be translated as
decreased incidences of sexual crimes as defined by the Uniform Crime Reporting
system. Second, as the federal and state governments have an inherent motivation to
keep accurate data regarding criminal offenses in general and sexual offenses in
particular, that same data will be considered to be reliable by default despite counting
Forcible Rape only against women. The National Crime Victimization Survey, being
extrapolated from a sample size rather than directly reported national data, have been
foregone in favor of the Uniform Crime Report.

69

"If you can't explain it simply, you don't understand it well enough" - Albert Einstein
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Within that framework, and thanks to the abundance of statistical data from 1971
until 2009, it is a simple matter to compare the significant dates of the major sex
offender registration laws such as the 1997 compliance deadline of the original
Wetterling Act against the real number and population adjusted rate of sexual offenses
both at the national level and within the State of Florida. For control purposes the overall
rate of violent crimes not falling under the purview of these acts will also be considered.
On the following pages are three tables of data which collectively show the rates of
violent crime and sex crimes at the national level and within the State of Florida.
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Table 1: Estimated crime in United States-Total
Mu rd er an d
no nn eg lig en t
V iolen t Crim e ma nsla ug hte r Forcible ra pe
ra te
rate
ra te

Y ear

Po pu lation

Violen t c rim e
t ota l

M urde r an d
no nn eglig ent
Ma nslau gh ter

19 71
19 72
19 73

2 06 ,21 2, 000 .0
2 08 ,23 0, 000 .0
2 09 ,85 1, 000 .0

8 16, 50 0.0
8 34, 90 0.0
8 75, 91 0.0

1 7,7 80 .0
1 8,6 70 .0
1 9,6 40 .0

42 ,26 0. 0
46 ,85 0. 0
51 ,40 0. 0

36 8, 760 .0
39 3, 090 .0
42 0, 650 .0

39 6.0
40 1.0
41 7.4

8 .6
9 .0
9 .4

20. 5
22. 5
24. 5

17 8.8
18 8.8
20 0.5

19 74
19 75

2 11 ,39 2, 000 .0
2 13 ,12 4, 000 .0

9 74, 72 0.0
1,0 39 ,71 0. 0

2 0,7 10 .0
2 0,5 10 .0

55 ,40 0. 0
56 ,09 0. 0

45 6, 210 .0
49 2, 620 .0

46 1.1
48 7.8

9 .8
9 .6

26. 2
26. 3

21 5.8
23 1.1

19 76

2 14 ,65 9, 000 .0

1,0 04 ,21 0. 0

1 8,7 80 .0

57 ,08 0. 0

50 0, 530 .0

46 7.8

8 .7

26. 6

23 3.2

19 77

2 16 ,33 2, 000 .0

1,0 29 ,58 0. 0

1 9,1 20 .0

63 ,50 0. 0

53 4, 350 .0

47 5.9

8 .8

29. 4

24 7.0

19 78
19 79

2 18 ,05 9, 000 .0
2 20 ,09 9, 000 .0

1,0 85 ,55 0. 0
1,2 08 ,03 0. 0

1 9,5 60 .0
2 1,4 60 .0

67 ,61 0. 0
76 ,39 0. 0

57 1, 460 .0
62 9, 480 .0

49 7.8
54 8.9

9 .0
9 .8

31. 0
34. 7

26 2.1
28 6.0

Forcible ra pe

A ggra vate d
assa ult

Ag grava te d
assa ult ra te

19 80

2 25 ,34 9, 264 .0

1,3 44 ,52 0. 0

2 3,0 40 .0

82 ,99 0. 0

67 2, 650 .0

59 6.6

1 0.2

36. 8

29 8.5

19 81
19 82

2 29 ,46 5, 714 .0
2 31 ,66 4, 458 .0

1,3 61 ,82 0. 0
1,3 22 ,39 0. 0

2 2,5 20 .0
2 1,0 10 .0

82 ,50 0. 0
78 ,77 0. 0

66 3, 900 .0
66 9, 480 .0

59 3.5
57 0.8

9 .8
9 .1

36. 0
34. 0

28 9.3
28 9.0

19 83
19 84
19 85

2 33 ,79 1, 994 .0
2 35 ,82 4, 902 .0
2 37 ,92 3, 795 .0

1,2 58 ,08 7. 0
1,2 73 ,28 2. 0
1,3 27 ,76 7. 0

1 9,3 08 .0
1 8,6 92 .0
1 8,9 76 .0

78 ,91 8. 0
84 ,23 3. 0
87 ,67 1. 0

65 3, 294 .0
68 5, 349 .0
72 3, 246 .0

53 8.1
53 9.9
55 8.1

8 .3
7 .9
8 .0

33. 8
35. 7
36. 8

27 9.4
29 0.6
30 4.0

19 86
19 87

2 40 ,13 2, 887 .0
2 42 ,28 8, 918 .0

1,4 89 ,16 9. 0
1,4 83 ,99 9. 0

2 0,6 13 .0
2 0,0 96 .0

91 ,45 9. 0
91 ,11 1. 0

83 4, 322 .0
85 5, 088 .0

62 0.1
61 2.5

8 .6
8 .3

38. 1
37. 6

34 7.4
35 2.9

19 88
19 89
19 90

2 44 ,49 8, 982 .0
2 46 ,81 9, 230 .0
2 49 ,46 4, 396 .0

1,5 66 ,22 1. 0
1,6 46 ,03 7. 0
1,8 20 ,12 7. 0

2 0,6 75 .0
2 1,5 00 .0
2 3,4 38 .0

92 ,48 6. 0
94 ,50 4. 0
10 2,5 55 .0

91 0, 092 .0
95 1, 707 .0
1,0 54 ,86 3. 0

64 0.6
66 6.9
72 9.6

8 .5
8 .7
9 .4

37. 8
38. 3
41. 1

37 2.2
38 5.6
42 2.9

19 91
19 92
19 93

2 52 ,15 3, 092 .0
2 55 ,02 9, 699 .0
2 57 ,78 2, 608 .0

1,9 11 ,76 7. 0
1,9 32 ,27 4. 0
1,9 26 ,01 7. 0

2 4,7 03 .0
2 3,7 60 .0
2 4,5 26 .0

10 6,5 93 .0
10 9,0 62 .0
10 6,0 14 .0

1,0 92 ,73 9. 0
1,1 26 ,97 4. 0
1,1 35 ,60 7. 0

75 8.2
75 7.7
74 7.1

9 .8
9 .3
9 .5

42. 3
42. 8
41. 1

43 3.4
44 1.9
44 0.5

19 94
19 95
19 96

2 60 ,32 7, 021 .0
2 62 ,80 3, 276 .0
2 65 ,22 8, 572 .0

1,8 57 ,67 0. 0
1,7 98 ,79 2. 0
1,6 88 ,54 0. 0

2 3,3 26 .0
2 1,6 06 .0
1 9,6 45 .0

10 2,2 16 .0
97 ,47 0. 0
96 ,25 2. 0

1,1 13 ,17 9. 0
1,0 99 ,20 7. 0
1,0 37 ,04 9. 0

71 3.6
68 4.5
63 6.6

9 .0
8 .2
7 .4

39. 3
37. 1
36. 3

42 7.6
41 8.3
39 1.0

19 97

2 67 ,78 3, 607 .0

1,6 36 ,09 6. 0

1 8,2 08 .0

96 ,15 3. 0

1,0 23 ,20 1. 0

61 1.0

6 .8

35. 9

38 2.1

19 98
19 99

2 70 ,24 8, 003 .0
2 72 ,69 0, 813 .0

1,5 33 ,88 7. 0
1,4 26 ,04 4. 0

1 6,9 74 .0
1 5,5 22 .0

93 ,14 4. 0
89 ,41 1. 0

97 6, 583 .0
91 1, 740 .0

56 7.6
52 3.0

6 .3
5 .7

34. 5
32. 8

36 1.4
33 4.3

20 00
20 01
20 02

2 81 ,42 1, 906 .0
2 85 ,31 7, 559 .0
2 87 ,97 3, 924 .0

1,4 25 ,48 6. 0
1,4 39 ,48 0. 0
1,4 23 ,67 7. 0

1 5,5 86 .0
1 6,0 37 .0
1 6,2 29 .0

90 ,17 8. 0
90 ,86 3. 0
95 ,23 5. 0

91 1, 706 .0
90 9, 023 .0
89 1, 407 .0

50 6.5
50 4.5
49 4.4

5 .5
5 .6
5 .6

32. 0
31. 8
33. 1

32 4.0
31 8.6
30 9.5

20 03
20 04

2 90 ,78 8, 976 .0
2 93 ,65 6, 842 .0

1,3 83 ,67 6. 0
1,3 60 ,08 8. 0

1 6,5 28 .0
1 6,1 48 .0

93 ,88 3. 0
95 ,08 9. 0

85 9, 030 .0
84 7, 381 .0

47 5.8
46 3.2

5 .7
5 .5

32. 3
32. 4

29 5.4
28 8.6

20 05

2 96 ,50 7, 061 .0

1,3 90 ,74 5. 0

1 6,7 40 .0

94 ,34 7. 0

86 2, 220 .0

46 9.0

5 .6

31. 8

29 0.8

20 06

2 99 ,39 8, 484 .0

1,4 18 ,04 3. 0

1 7,0 30 .0

92 ,75 7. 0

86 0, 853 .0

47 3.6

5 .7

31. 0

28 7.5

20 07
20 08

3 01 ,62 1, 157 .0
3 04 ,37 4, 846 .0

1,4 08 ,33 7. 0
1,3 92 ,62 9. 0

1 6,9 29 .0
1 6,4 42 .0

90 ,42 7. 0
90 ,47 9. 0

85 5, 856 .0
84 2, 134 .0

46 6.9
45 7.5

5 .6
5 .4

30. 0
29. 7

28 3.8
27 6.7

20 09

3 07 ,00 6, 550 .0

1,3 18 ,39 8. 0

1 5,2 41 .0

88 ,09 7. 0

80 6, 843 .0

42 9.4

5 .0

28. 7

26 2.8

N ational or state offense totals are based on data fr om all reporting agencies and estim ates for unreported ar eas.
Rates ar e the number of r epor ted offenses per 100,000 population
T he 2,823 m urder and nonnegligent hom icides that occur red as a result of the events of Septem ber 11,
2001, ar e not incl uded i n the national estim ates.
U nited States-T otal - T he 168 murder and nonnegligent hom icides that occur red as a r esult of the bom bing of the
Alfred P. M urr ah Feder al Building in Oklahom a City in 1995 are included i n the national estim ate.
Sources: F BI, U niform C rim e Reports, prepared by the N ational Archive of C rim inal Justice Data
D ate of download: Mar 12 2012
U niform Cr im e Reporting Statistics - UC R Data Online
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Table 2: Statewide Sex Offenses for Florida, 1971 - 2010.
A tte mp ted
Rap e

To tal
Forcible
Ra pe

Forcible Ra pe
Ra te per
1 00 ,00 0

P ercen t
Cha ng e
Rap e Ra te

Pe rce nt Chan ge
Rap e Nu mb er

Fo rcible
So dom y

Forcible
Fo nd lin g

Tot al Forcible
S ex Of fen ses

Forcible Se x
P ercen t Cha ng e
O ffe nse s Rate S ex O ffe nses Rate
pe r 10 0,0 00
pe r 1 00 ,00 0

Yea r

Po pula tion

Rap e by
Force

1 97 1

7,0 41 ,07 4

1, 19 1

51 7

1, 70 8

24 .3

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

1 97 2

7,4 41 ,54 5

1, 38 2

53 7

1, 91 9

25 .8

6.3

12 .4

--

--

--

--

--

1 97 3
1 97 4
1 97 5

7,8 45 ,09 2
8,2 48 ,85 1
8,4 85 ,23 0

1, 79 2
2, 15 3
2, 15 8

65 8
75 1
82 7

2, 45 0
2, 90 4
2, 98 5

31 .2
35 .2
35 .2

2 1. 1
1 2. 7
-0. 1

27 .7
18 .5
2 .8

----

----

----

----

----

1 97 6
1 97 7
1 97 8

8,5 51 ,81 4
8,7 17 ,33 4
8,9 67 ,20 6

2, 25 5
2, 53 2
3, 02 4

79 6
81 0
93 6

3, 05 1
3, 34 2
3, 96 0

35 .7
38 .3
44 .2

1.4
7.5
1 5. 2

2 .2
9 .5
18 .5

----

----

----

----

----

1 97 9
1 98 0
1 98 1

9,2 45 ,23 1
9,5 79 ,49 7
10, 09 7,7 54

3, 54 1
4, 23 0
4, 46 0

1,0 32
1,2 05
1,2 47

4, 57 3
5, 43 5
5, 70 7

49 .5
56 .7
56 .5

1 2. 0
1 4. 7
-0. 4

15 .5
18 .8
5 .0

----

----

----

----

----

1 98 2

10, 37 5,3 32

4, 27 8

1,3 08

5, 58 6

53 .8

-4. 7

-2.1

--

--

--

--

--

1 98 3
1 98 4

10, 59 1,7 01
10, 93 0,3 89

3, 95 2
4, 32 0

1,2 18
1,2 56

5, 17 0
5, 57 6

48 .8
51 .0

-9. 3
4.5

-7.4
7 .9

---

---

---

---

---

1 98 5
1 98 6

11, 27 8,5 47
11, 65 7,8 43

4, 82 4
4, 90 3

1,1 80
1,2 50

6, 00 4
6, 15 3

53 .2
52 .8

4.4
-0. 9

7 .7
2 .5

---

---

---

---

---

1 98 7

12, 04 3,6 08

4, 82 3

1,1 94

6, 01 7

50 .0

-5. 3

-2.2

--

--

--

--

--

1 98 8
1 98 9

12, 41 7,6 06
12, 79 7,3 18

-5, 59 9

-70 0

-6, 29 9

-49 .2

---

---

-1 ,5 31

-3, 367

-11 ,1 97

-8 7. 5

---

1 99 0

13, 15 0,0 27

6, 00 4

66 3

6, 66 7

50 .7

3.0

5 .8

1 ,5 93

3, 770

12 ,0 30

9 1. 5

4 .6

1 99 1
1 99 2
1 99 3

13, 19 5,9 52
13, 42 4,4 16
13, 60 8,6 27

6, 37 9
6, 59 8
6, 71 3

59 0
68 2
55 0

6, 96 9
7, 28 0
7, 26 3

52 .8
54 .2
53 .4

4.2
2.7
-1. 6

4 .5
4 .5
-0.2

1 ,5 09
1 ,7 40
1 ,9 48

3, 912
4, 409
4, 541

12 ,3 90
13 ,4 29
13 ,7 52

9 3. 9
1 00. 0
1 01. 1

2 .6
6 .5
1 .0

1 99 4
1 99 5
1 99 6

13, 87 8,9 05
14, 14 9,3 17
14, 41 1,5 63

6, 63 0
6, 29 9
6, 96 4

58 4
52 5
54 4

7, 21 4
6, 82 4
7, 50 8

52 .0
48 .2
52 .1

-2. 6
-7. 2
8.0

-0.7
-5.4
10 .0

2 ,0 09
1 ,6 78
1 ,5 09

4, 190
3, 757
3, 925

13 ,4 13
12 ,2 59
12 ,9 42

9 6. 6
8 6. 6
8 9. 8

-4.4
-10. 4
3 .7

1 99 7
1 99 8
1 99 9

14, 71 2,9 22
15, 00 0,4 75
15, 32 2,0 40

7, 14 2
6, 85 8
6, 42 9

53 0
53 5
53 6

7, 67 2
7, 39 3
6, 96 5

52 .1
49 .3
45 .5

0.1
-5. 5
-7. 8

2 .2
-3.6
-5.8

1 ,6 80
1 ,5 61
1 ,5 82

3, 872
3, 748
4, 036

13 ,2 24
12 ,7 02
12 ,5 83

8 9. 9
8 4. 7
8 2. 1

0 .1
-5.8
-3.0
-5.6

2 00 0

15, 98 2,3 78

6, 48 0

47 2

6, 95 2

43 .5

-4. 3

-0.2

1 ,4 85

3, 951

12 ,3 88

7 7. 5

2 00 1

16, 33 1,7 39

6, 17 5

45 5

6, 63 0

40 .6

-6. 7

-4.6

1 ,5 87

4, 539

12 ,7 56

7 8. 1

0 .8

2 00 2
2 00 3
2 00 4

16, 67 4,6 08
17, 07 1,5 08
17, 51 6,7 32

6, 27 6
6, 32 3
6, 16 8

42 8
40 1
44 1

6, 70 4
6, 72 4
6, 60 9

40 .2
39 .4
37 .7

-0. 9
-2. 0
-4. 2

1 .1
0 .3
-1.7

1 ,5 59
1 ,5 96
1 ,4 90

4, 547
4, 436
4, 328

12 ,8 10
12 ,7 56
12 ,4 27

7 6. 8
7 4. 7
7 0. 9

-1.6
-2.7
-5.1

2 00 5
2 00 6
2 00 7

17, 91 8,2 27
18, 34 9,1 32
18, 68 0,3 67

6, 15 6
6, 10 2
5, 76 2

42 0
36 9
38 3

6, 57 6
6, 47 1
6, 14 5

36 .7
35 .3
32 .9

-2. 7
-3. 9
-6. 8

-0.5
-1.6
-5

1 ,5 07
1 ,3 60
1 ,4 02

4, 147
3, 736
3, 667

12 ,2 30
11 ,5 67
11 ,2 14

6 8. 3
63
60

-3.7
-7.7
-4.8

2 00 8
2 00 9

18, 80 7,2 19
18, 75 0,4 83

5, 60 6
5, 17 0

35 6
32 4

5, 96 2
5, 49 4

29 .8
29 .3

-9. 4
-1. 7

-3.0
-7.8

1 ,3 01
1 ,3 06

3, 560
3, 427

10 ,8 23
10 ,2 27

5 7. 5
5 4. 5

-4.1
-5.2
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Table 3: Florida's Crime Rate, 1971 - 2010
Tota l
Vi olent
Crime

Total
Nonvi ol ent
Cri me

Inde x Rate per
1 00 ,00 0

P opulation
Per cent
Cha nge

Inde x Cri me
Per cent Change

Index Rate
P erc ent
Change

Ye ar

P opul ation

Total Index
Crime

19 71
19 72

7 ,04 1,0 74
7 ,44 1,5 45

39 9, 055
39 0, 319

3 8,5 71
4 0,2 68

3 60 ,4 84
3 50 ,0 51

5 ,66 7. 5
5 ,24 5. 1

-5.7

--2. 2

--7.5

19 73
19 74
19 75

7 ,84 5,0 92
8 ,24 8,8 51
8 ,48 5,2 30

45 7, 882
59 7, 667
64 5, 338

4 6,4 30
5 4,8 52
5 7,6 63

4 11 ,4 52
5 42 ,8 15
5 87 ,6 75

5 ,83 6. 5
7 ,24 5. 5
7 ,60 5. 4

5.4
5.1
2.9

1 7. 3
3 0. 5
8.0

11 .3
24 .1
5 .0

19 76
19 77

8 ,55 1,8 14
8 ,71 7,3 34

59 0, 104
56 8, 878

5 4,5 43
5 7,9 57

5 35 ,5 61
5 10 ,9 21

6 ,90 0. 3
6 ,52 5. 8

0.8
1.9

-8. 6
-3. 6

-9.3
-5.4

19 78

8 ,96 7,2 06

60 7, 291

6 5,7 84

5 41 ,5 07

6 ,77 2. 4

2.9

6.8

3 .8

19 79
19 80
19 81

9 ,24 5,2 31
9 ,57 9,4 97
10 ,09 7, 75 4

68 0, 896
80 3, 509
81 6, 439

7 3,8 66
9 4,0 88
9 8,0 90

6 07 ,0 30
7 09 ,4 21
7 18 ,3 49

7 ,36 4. 8
8 ,38 7. 8
8 ,08 5. 4

3.1
3.6
5.4

1 2. 1
18
1.6

8 .7
13 .9
-3.6

19 82
19 83
19 84

10 ,37 5, 33 2
10 ,59 1, 70 1
10 ,93 0, 38 9

77 7, 517
72 4, 247
74 9, 231

9 3,4 06
8 8,2 98
9 5,3 68

6 84 ,1 11
6 35 ,9 49
6 53 ,8 63

7 ,49 3. 9
6 ,83 7. 9
6 ,85 4. 6

2.7
2.1
3.2

-4. 8
-6. 9
3.4

-7.3
-8.8
0 .2

19 85
19 86
19 87

11 ,27 8, 54 7
11 ,65 7, 84 3
12 ,04 3, 60 8

86 0, 957
96 0, 374
1,0 21 ,28 3

10 6,9 80
12 0,9 77
12 3,0 30

7 53 ,9 77
8 39 ,3 97
8 98 ,2 53

7 ,63 3. 6
8 ,23 8. 0
8 ,47 9. 9

3.2
3.4
3.3

1 4. 9
1 1. 5
6.3

11 .4
7 .9
2 .9

19 88

12 ,41 7, 60 6

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

19 89
19 90

12 ,79 7, 31 8
13 ,15 0, 02 7

1,1 20 ,51 5
1,1 22 ,93 5

14 5,4 73
16 0,5 54

9 75 ,0 42
9 62 ,3 81

8 ,75 5. 9
8 ,53 9. 4

-2.8

-0.2

--2.5

19 91
19 92
19 93

13 ,19 5, 95 2
13 ,42 4, 41 6
13 ,60 8, 62 7

1,1 29 ,70 4
1,1 12 ,74 6
1,1 16 ,56 7

15 8,1 81
16 1,1 37
16 1,7 89

9 71 ,5 23
9 51 ,6 09
9 54 ,7 78

8 ,56 1. 0
8 ,28 9. 0
8 ,20 4. 8

0.3
1.7
1.4

0.6
-1. 5
0.3

0 .3
-3.2
-1.0

19 94
19 95

13 ,87 8, 90 5
14 ,14 9, 31 7

1,1 30 ,87 5
1,0 78 ,61 9

15 7,8 35
15 0,2 08

9 73 ,0 40
9 28 ,4 11

8 ,14 8. 2
7 ,62 3. 1

2
1.9

1.3
-4. 6

-0.7
-6.4

19 96

14 ,41 1, 56 3

1,0 79 ,62 3

15 1,3 50

9 28 ,2 73

7 ,49 1. 4

1.9

0.1

-1.7
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14 ,71 2, 92 2
15 ,00 0, 47 5

1,0 73 ,75 7
1,0 25 ,10 0

15 0,8 01
13 9,6 73

9 22 ,9 56
8 85 ,4 27

7 ,29 8. 1
6 ,83 3. 8

2.1
2

-0. 5
-4. 5

-2.6
-6.4

19 99
20 00

15 ,32 2, 04 0
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93 4, 349
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12 8,8 59
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8 05 ,4 90
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5 ,60 4. 3

2.1
4.3

-8. 9
-4. 1

-1 0.8
-8.1

20 01

16 ,33 1, 73 9

91 1, 292

13 0,3 23

7 80 ,9 69

5 ,57 9. 9

2.2

1.7

-0.4

20 02
20 03
20 04

16 ,67 4, 60 8
17 ,07 1, 50 8
17 ,51 6, 73 2

90 0, 155
88 1, 615
85 0, 490
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7 57 ,3 79
7 26 ,7 93
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5 ,16 4. 2
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2.1
2.4
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-1. 2
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20 05
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12 5,8 25
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7 20 ,4 25
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-1. 5
1.4
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20 07

18 ,86 0, 36 7
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13 1,7 81

7 45 ,2 00
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2.8
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20 08
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18 ,75 0, 48 3

88 3, 905
82 4, 559

12 6,0 72
11 3,4 15

7 57 ,8 33
7 11 ,1 44
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4 ,39 7. 5

0.7
-0. 3

0.8
-6. 7

0 .1
-6.4

SOURCE: Florida Statistica l An alysis Cen ter: FDLE, Crime in Florid a, Flo rida un if orm crime repo rt, 1971-2010 . Tallah asse e, FL.
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Analysis
The data begins in 1971, showing a national violent crime rate of 396 violent
crimes per 100,000 individuals 70 and the Florida violent crime rate of 5,667.5 per
100,000 individuals 71 . From here it is important to note that of use to this work is not the
exact rate of offenses but the overall trend of that rate over time. The rate of violent
crime not including sex offenses may seem irrelevant at first however it is in fact a vital
baseline. As there has been no SORNA or comparable legislation (let alone the ordered
progression thereof) for violent crimes such as aggravated assault, murder, and the like
violent crime should be affected only by the overall state of society rather than artificially
suppressed through directed legislative efforts. If the rhetoric is valid, and legislation
such as SORNA and its predecessors are indeed responsible for suppressing both
initial sexual offenses and recidivism, then the rate of sexual crimes should show a
marked difference from the baseline rate of "ordinary" (violent and personal) predatory
crimes which at least correlates to the dates where major legislation took effect.

With that in mind the most significant dates may be considered to be the primary
landmarks of federal legislation: The 1994 Wetterling Act, the 1996 Megan's Law and
Pam Lychner acts, the 1997 Wetterling Improvements Act, and the 2006 Adam Walsh
Protection Act (SORNA). Following this timeline, if the rhetoric holds true to its claims,
sexual crimes should show a marked decrease as compared to the baseline rate of

70
71

Table 1
Table 3
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violent crime starting in approximately 1995 after the Wetterling Act would have had
time to begin to take effect… and at first glance it would seem to be the case that this
holds true. Beginning in 1994 the national rate of forcible rape began a slow but steady
decline, and in the State of Florida the rate of forcible sex crimes began to decrease
irregularly yet markedly from what had appeared to be a 5 year upward trend going
back to the beginning of recorded data in 1989. Interestingly however the rate of forcible
rape in the State of Florida continued to hold steady around approximately 50 per
100,000 individuals for another four years, making for a 20 year high beginning in 1979
and lasting until 1998.

All of this appears to point to a reductive effect coinciding with federal legislation;
however there are two issues with this interpretation. First, recall the significance
assigned to the overall trends of the violent and sexual crime rates. The rate of sexual
crimes, and of forcible rape, does decline beginning in 1994, however so does the rate
of violent crime in almost identical proportions. Furthermore as additional national UCR
data contained in the appendices shows this trend extends beyond violent crime into the
national rate of robberies per 100,000 people as well… a crime well beyond the purview
of federal sex offender legislation. In fact the reduction in all crime is so profound that it
outstrips population growth and even in Table 3's list of Total Nonviolent Crime, which is
not a population adjusted figure, still holds true to the trend.

Now, perhaps the legislative fervor of the Houses of Congress singlehandedly
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frightened the entirety of the criminal world within the United States of America into
submission in 1994 with the Wetterling Act, it is not impossible that the sheer quantity of
attention directed at this one area of criminal behavior led to the rest of America's less
than upstanding citizens deciding en masse that it would be best to find a more
publically acceptable occupation or hobby before they drew too much attention. It is
decidedly more likely though that there was already a pre-existing trend to the reduction
of all crime and the measured reduction in sex offenses was nothing more than this
trend showing through in a class of crime under such intense and myopic scrutiny (or
subject to such disingenuous political opportunism) that the greater trend went
uncredited. It strains credulity to claim that legislation on a single family of offenses,
even legislation as high profile as sex offender registration's many iterations, could have
such a widespread impact that even the rate of robberies in the United States of
America would be nearly halved along the same timeline as the reduction in sexual
offenses 72 .

Unforeseen Consequences
If, then, these laws did not accomplish their stated goal and merely had the
appearance of correlation rather than any true causation, the question then becomes
what were the results of these laws. The consensus, as summarized 73 by George B.
Palermo in the International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology,
72

Table 1: 256 robberies per 100,000 people in 1993 descending to 133 in 2009; 51.9% of the 1993
value.
73
Palermo summarizing Applebaum, Farkas, Levenson, Palermo & Farkas, Prescott and Zevitz
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is that registration has had an effect… but not remotely the desired one. It is a fact often
lost in the dryness of academia and the fervor of political rhetoric that registration does
not occur in a vacuum. These lists are not magic scrolls within sealed containers acting
as talismans against those whose names and crimes are enumerated within, they are
public, inflammatory, and to the offenders listed in them terribly effective at publicizing
their contents. Now if the issues of cost, efficacy and constitutional erosion, are not
enough to induce a healthy skepticism of the value of these registries as they exist then
perhaps the opinions of mental health professionals (the experts tasked with handling
and treating offenders) on the topic of community notification, an integral and arguably
defining part of a modern sex offender registry, should be considered as holding
considerable weight. In results collected 74 from another work which surveyed 499
mental health professionals 36% may have voiced some support for the efficacy of
community notification in increasing community safety but a larger 40% felt that there
was no effect at all and 26% actually believed the registries to be less safe. In two more
surveys cited by the same work 70% and 74% of surveyed mental health professionals
felt community notification gave a false sense of security.

Their skepticism is not without good cause. Registered sex offenders face not a
lifetime of ostracism and harassment to such an extent that for many it may well be
impossible for them to ever reintegrate into society or even live within it at all. In a study

74

Lasher & McGrath citing McGrath, Cumming, Burchard, Zeoli, & Ellerby; Malesky and Keim; and
Levenson, Fortney, and Baker internally
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which sought to collect and analyze the collective body of research in this field 75 the
results showed up to 1/3rd of sex offenders reported losing their jobs, slightly less than
1/10th reported violent attacks, and the reports of surveyed families painted an even
bleaker picture; a staggering 82% reported financial hardship, 44% reported
harassment, and 7% reported being assaulted or injured just by virtue of their
relationship with a registered offender. It should be no wonder then that some regions
have found themselves holding released sex offenders in out of the way motels while
they desperately attempt to find housing and employment that meets the restrictions
placed on them 76 , though in other less hospitable districts there have been cases of
offenders being forced into homelessness 77 by residency restrictions and thereafter
arrested for failing to register an address.

75

Lasher & McGrath
Langhorne
77
Dewan
76
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Conclusion
It is these kinds of consequences, often dismissed as acceptable collateral
damage for a class of people so publically reviled, which in actuality prove registries and
notification to be counter-productive. Evidence has been found which links these
supposedly acceptable side-effects to increased recidivism 78 , a conclusion which
should surprise no one. It does not take a rigorous graduate education to know that
creating an ostracized and reviled subclass with no prospects for employment, ever
shrinking opportunities for shelter, subject to constant harassment and even assault, is
not a productive means of discouraging recidivism. The evidence speaks for itself: sex
offender registries as they exist today are a product of political profiteering and public
hysteria ineffective at their stated purpose and increasingly found to be openly counterproductive and damaging; With the current legal trend towards ever-increasing
restrictions and punishments the (alleged) outlier result of involuntarily homeless and
jobless sex offenders is fast becoming the new reality. The moral panic which propelled
the myth of the lurking predator into power came from a handful of high profile cases
which ordinarily only exist in Hollywood's imagination as the vast majority of sex
offenses are committed by relations and acquaintances. It is time for a reform of these
laws; this time founded on evidence based reasoning and rigorous study rather than
moral panic and political grandstanding. The status quo is simply untenable.

78

Lasher and McGrath internally citing Freeman & Sandler, 2010; Hanson et al., 2009
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Limiting Factors
There are a number of limiting or confounding factors which deserve to be
recognized. First and foremost the lack of national UCR data for the broader category of
sexual offenses other than forcible female rape is a significant limiting factor for
nationwide analysis. Secondly, and merely limiting, is the lack of comparably formatted
UCR data from other states. Comparing the trend of sexual offenses over time across
multiple states, particularly in the pre-SORNA years, would allow for greater specificity
than an overall national average. Lastly an in-depth comparison of the trends of sexual
offenses over time in regions with differing post-release restrictions would be an
excellent measurement of efficacy, but given the nature of research involved and the
confounding factors of development and demographics would likely require exorbitant
man-hours to perform.
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Appendix: Sex Offender Registration Laws by State Pre-Standardization, 1996
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